War and the Reelection Motive: Examining the Effect of Term Limits by Zeigler, Sean et al.
www.ssoar.info
War and the Reelection Motive: Examining the
Effect of Term Limits
Zeigler, Sean; Pierskalla, Jan H.; Mazumder, Sandeep
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Zeigler, S., Pierskalla, J. H., & Mazumder, S. (2013). War and the Reelection Motive: Examining the Effect of Term
Limits. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713478561
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-375543
 http://jcr.sagepub.com/
Journal of Conflict Resolution
 http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/03/13/0022002713478561
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0022002713478561
 published online 13 March 2013Journal of Conflict Resolution
Sean Zeigler, Jan H. Pierskalla and Sandeep Mazumder
War and the Reelection Motive: Examining the Effect of Term Limits
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
 
 Peace Science Society (International)
 can be found at:Journal of Conflict ResolutionAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://jcr.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 What is This?
 
- Mar 13, 2013OnlineFirst Version of Record >> 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Article
War and the Reelection
Motive: Examining the
Effect of Term Limits
Sean Zeigler1, Jan H. Pierskalla2, and
Sandeep Mazumder3
Abstract
This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international
conflict. Theories of political survival and diversionary war both imply term limits
should play a role in international relations, whereas ‘‘permanent referendum the-
ory,’’ largely motivated by work in American politics, suggests otherwise. Drawing
on these theories, we formulate and test competing hypotheses regarding term
limits and international crises. Using dyadic militarized interstate disputes data and
information on forty-eight democracies with term limits, we uncover strong evi-
dence to support the claim that leaders reaching final terms in office are more likely
to initiate conflict than those still subject to reelection. Moreover, we find that the
likelihood of conflict initiation is significantly higher during times of recession, but
only in the absence of binding term limits. While binding electoral terms and eco-
nomic downturns are both independently associated with increased levels of conflict
initiation, in concert their conditional effects actually counteract each other.
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What impact, if any, do term limits have on leaders and the use of force? This
straightforward question has garnered scant attention from scholars of international
relations.1 But it deserves exploration. That leaders are office-seeking is now a main-
stream assumption underlying many areas of domestic and party politics research.
Given specified constraints of the electoral environment, leaders or parties are
assumed to derive optimal policies for election or reelection (Downs 1957; Hinich
and Ordeshook 1970). The salience of domestic politics in shaping international
relations has become increasingly acknowledged, and work linking political struc-
tures with international conflict continues to grow. However, this research program
remains largely aloof to the impact of binding term limits. Owing to this dearth of
research, there are multiple hypotheses one might advance concerning the potential
impact term limits have on the use of force.
The essence of political survival is that heads of state behave so as to preserve
their power (de Mesquita et al. 2003). According to the ‘‘selectorate model,’’ dem-
ocratic leaders have to satisfy broad electoral constraints and autocratic rulers have
to satisfy a minimum support coalition. Thus, the driving incentive of leaders—be
they democratic or not—is to maintain office, to hold onto the position which affords
them their status and influence. This premise has arguably reached the level of
dogma in political science. And with good reason: it has provided a useful analytical
handle for grasping an array of issues within comparative politics and international
relations such as democratic peace (de Mesquita et al. 2003), territorial wars
(Chiozza and Choi 2003), or foreign aid allocation (de Mesquita and Smith 2007).
Term limits represent an observable and publicly known limitation on leader tenure.
Where observed, term limits serve as a structural impediment to remaining in power.
Viewed then from the prism of political survival, the implication is that if a term limit
binds or prevents a leader’s continuation of power, an observable difference in actions
should result, possibly by enabling a leader’s full scope of action.2 Put another way, if
the chief characteristic compelling a leader’s conduct is an operative desire to preserve
her position of power, then removing this motivation should alter behavior. Based on
this logic, changes in international conflict initiation (or in targeting) should result.
Additionally, term limits may interact with diversionary war motives, making conflict
more or less likely depending on socioeconomic contexts. This interpretation implies
that term limits should transform a leader’s susceptibility to diversionary inducements.
In this article, we assess whether limits on leadership tenure—a structural con-
straint common to many democratic states—have bearing on international affairs,
by focusing on their impact on the use of force. Expectations regarding this topic
vary based on the theoretical lens one uses to interpret it. By testing the implications
stemming from these various theories, we are better able to evaluate their applicabil-
ity to various aspects of international relations. Term limits may influence conflict
independently, as a strict interpretation of political survival would suggest. The pos-
sibility also remains that term limits alter diversionary incentives, by exempting
leaders from ballot box concerns during periods of socioeconomic difficulty.
And finally, the exigencies of high office may render leaders more or less
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permanently dependent on domestic public approval, thereby mitigating any impact
of binding terms.
We seek to adjudicate these differing perspectives by adding information on term
limits to a directed-dyad analysis. Specifically, we use data on binding term limits in
forty-eight democracies from 1976 to 2000 and ascertain their relationship with
international conflict. In addition, we add to the analysis by employing various
measures for economic recessions to investigate potential conditional effects of the
office-seeking assumption. This permits us to confront the evidence for term limits
directly with tests of diversionary theory. Inconsistent with what we call ‘‘permanent
referendum theory’’ (Russett 1990a), the empirical evidence we present shows
strong support for the importance of term limits as an independent factor. We find
leaders constrained by elections show less belligerency, while leaders subject to
binding final terms and thus less restricted by the demands of the electoral process,
engage in more conflictual behavior. Reaching final terms in office increases a lead-
er’s likelihood of initiating conflict by more than 50 percent. Importantly, we find
that economic recessions also strongly increase the likelihood of conflict initiation,
revealing diversionary motives at work. Interestingly, if term limits bind in times of
a recession, the effect vanishes and leaders can avoid satisfying diversionary
motives. These results are robust across various measures of recessions and different
estimation approaches. These outcomes also nicely dovetail with the existing liter-
ature, confirming a generally pacifying effect of elections, except in times of reces-
sion. Moreover, the results suggest that term limits act as a countervailing force to
office-seeking behavior; they may either increase or decrease the probability of
conflict, depending on the economic and political context leaders find themselves in.
Political Survival Interrupted?
The relationship between the office-seeking incentives of leaders and conflict is by
now a long-standing inquiry in international relations. Much of the early work in this
area examines the US case, especially after World War II (WWII). Stoll (1984) ana-
lyzes the impact of visible military force on US elections from 1947 to 1982. He
finds that presidents may attempt to gain a ‘‘rally around the flag’’ effect by
engaging in the visible use of force during reelections. Russett (1990b) finds that
US participation in the initiation or escalation of a dispute is positively related to
a presidential-election-year dummy variable. Work by Wang (1996) and Russett
(1990a) suggests military action is more likely shortly before an election. Hess and
Orphanides (1995) use a nonparametric approach to test for the increased frequency
of US wars during periods when a president seeks reelection and the economy’s per-
formance has been weak. Examining the years from 1953 to 1988, they find that the
conditional probability of war approximately doubles (from 30 to 60 percent) during
any year in which a president is not in a final term and which experiences an eco-
nomic recession.
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However, a more refined strand of this literature focuses specifically on how the
risk of losing office impacts the calculus of conflict. It also moves beyond the single
US case. This work spans war initiation (de Mesquita et al. 1999) to its termination
(Goemans 2000), and many of its in-betweens, for example, war expansion (Siver-
son 1996). Chiozza and Geomans (2003) also offer empirical evidence for a recipro-
cal relationship between tenure and conflict. The authors find that as the risk of
losing office increases, leaders become less likely to initiate a crisis and that as the
risk of an international crisis increases, leaders become more likely to lose office.
One aspect of this relationship deals with war and selective incentives. As noted,
the selectorate model (de Mesquita et al. 2003) is the workhorse theory in this
research program. It suggests that the ballot box is of fundamental importance to
heads of state; leaders must satisfy their coalitions or be punished at election time.
They therefore choose policies with a view to remaining in office. Moreover, war
conduct is inextricably influenced via political calculations associated with tenure
because outcomes in international conflict can impact tenure duration. Seeking to
preserve their power, leaders only involve themselves in disputes if such actions are
likely to prolong their time in office. From this perspective, leaders are thought to
choose their fights well (de Mesquita et al. 2003). In sum, heads of state selecting
into international disputes do so because it advances tenure prospects. For the same
reasons, leaders are thought to avoid conflicts that may cut short their time in office.
However, research in this area diverges from diversionary use-of-force literature in
its expectations about the timing of war and the likelihood of losing office. It argues
that the lower the risk of being put out of office, the higher is the likelihood of conflict
initiation. The logic here suggests there is a premium on political security because it
offers either a basis of support for conflict situations or a buffer against the poor out-
comes (de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) they may entail. Gaubatz (1991) finds that
states are most likely to become involved in a militarized dispute earlier rather than
later in an election cycle. Huth and Allee (2002) similarly report that challengers are
more likely to pursue efforts at altering the status quo after general elections.
While selectorate theory helps motivate the discussion, it does not by itself lead to
precise predictions related to term limits and international conflict. It does, however,
assist in properly situating the question. The selectorate model generates the expec-
tation that nondemocratic leaders are more prone to risk conflict than are their dem-
ocratic counterparts. This outcome is largely a consequence of the relatively smaller
winning coalitions authoritarian rulers must satisfy. However, the private goods
mechanism by which nondemocratic heads of state protect themselves from failed
international adventures does not plainly apply to leaders facing final terms in office.
Term limits do not affect or directly impact the size of minimum winning coalitions;
they make them irrelevant.
This gives rise to an open-ended question. When binding term limits effectively
unhinge leaders from the dictates of electoral accountability, how might we expect
them to behave regarding the security of the state? Should we anticipate more
bellicosity or restraint? The expectations of permanent referendum theory
4 Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
notwithstanding, leaders in final terms will enjoy more latitude to pursue favored
actions pertaining to conflict scenarios; but are we able to say much about such
actions ex ante? Toward addressing this issue, a host of arguments suggests that term
limited leaders should behave more aggressively than those leaders still appealing to
winning coalitions or the median voter.
Jackson and Morelli (2007) consider a model where the decision to attempt inter-
national war is essentially a cost–benefit calculation. In their analysis, it is the ratio
of a leader’s share of the benefits from war compared to her share of costs that is a
critical determinant in opting for conflict. The propensity of a leader to prefer going
to war is thought to increase as the ratio of gain to risk associated with war rises.
Autocratic leaders are said to have a greater inclination for war than do democratic
leaders, on account of their political ‘‘bias.’’ That is, they have a higher benefit-to-
cost ratio compared to their society as a whole and thereby a higher conflict ten-
dency. The authors argue that in authoritarian or military regimes, rulers can keep
a disproportionate share of the spoils of war. The effect is to engender a positive
or greater bias for war. By contrast, democratic heads of state are more likely to
overweigh the costs rather than the private benefits associated with conflict. For
instance, if the risk of being voted out of office is higher after losing a war, then
leaders may overemphasize the costs of conflict relative to the gains.
Extending this ‘‘political bias’’ analysis to incorporate term limits is straightfor-
ward. Term limits obviate the concern of being removed from office after losing a
risky war. Exit from office is anticipated at the conclusion of final terms. Therefore,
if the likelihood of being untimely removed from office engenders a lower war bias,
then eliminating such a risk should appreciably raise a leader’s political bias. Put
differently, if binding terms reduce the costs of war, thereby raising war’s benefit-
to-cost ratio, then leaders should find war more attractive in final terms.
The cost argument applies similarly to Fearon’s (1994) theory of domestic audi-
ences and international disputes. The ‘‘audience costs’’ associated with domestic
constituencies make leaders acutely sensitive to the consequences of failed interna-
tional endeavors. This mechanism is more likely to operate in democratic states,
where domestic audiences play a larger role in the fate of leaders. A key implication
of the theory is that domestically unaccountable leaders—that is, authoritarian
rulers—should find it easier to engage in risky military endeavors and then back
down if met with strong resistance.3 If arriving in a final term lowers a leader’s sen-
sitivity to domestic audience costs, then, all else being equal, they should be more
inclined to engage in military disputes or ‘‘limited probes.’’
Term limits may also impact the benefits side of the political bias model. The
fighting for survival explanation for war (Chiozza and Goemans 2011) argues that
the risk of regular removal from office declines when leaders are the initiators of
international crises, as opposed to the targets. This challenge benefit accrues, in part,
because in times of war, scheduled elections often are postponed until after the war.
Such benefits may be partially applicable to leaders facing binding terms, especially
if that leader aims to delay elections. But more importantly, the victors in war often
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overthrow the norms, rules, and institutions that previously guided the regular trans-
fer of power. The decision to initiate conflicts also opens the door to political
possibilities that may otherwise be deemed too harsh during peacetime. This logic
implies that if term limited leaders harbor ambitions to overturn or otherwise thwart
the limits to their tenure, doing so under the cover of ongoing conflict may present
the best opportunity. In conjunction, the audience cost, political bias, and fighting for
survival theories imply the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: War bias hypothesis–Leaders with binding term limits will be
more likely to initiate international conflict than leaders without binding term
limits.
The costs associated with electoral accountability serve as a deterring device
between leaders and foreign adventures. By mitigating the costs or sensitivity to
them, term limits are expected to remove the disciplining effect elections have on
conflict-seeking behavior. There may also be distinct benefits to initiating conflicts
in final terms. Notwithstanding this line of argument, there is reason to suspect
precisely the opposite. Term limits may remove incentives for initiating conflicts,
prompting fewer incidences of international crisis.
Diversionary Expectations
As already noted, the literature on diversionary war generates alternative expectations
about conflict situations as compared to selectorate-based arguments. In general, the-
ories of diversionary war posit that a leader’s primary motive for involvement in inter-
national crises is to draw public attention away from domestic factors. The two causal
mechanisms commonly associated with diversionary war—the scapegoat hypothesis
and gambling for resurrection—both combine electoral motives with socioeconomic
concerns of the electorate. The former suggests that leaders use conflict to divert focus
from internal social, political, or economic problems, which are often the result of poor
policies (Morgan and Bickers 1992). The latter argues that leaders anticipating being
voted out of office relatively soon will rationally opt for a risky war, since even a small
probability of victory may offer a boon to reelection chances (Downs and Rocke
1994). Diversionary activity is thus attributed to some incentive variable speaking
to domestic discontent with the government.
If we give credence to the underlying mechanisms of diversionary war, then the
imposition of term limits alters drastically our expectations about conflict initiation.
Electability remains a driving force behind diversionary war. Anticipating that
domestic issues will negatively impact their electability, heads of state respond by
redirecting public attention outward. Diversionary conflict is the result. Binding
term limits, however, relieve leaders from electability concerns. Likewise, the
conflict-seeking inclination of heads of state should also be negated in final terms.
6 Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
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Hypothesis 1b: Diversionary negation hypothesis–Leaders with binding term
limits will be less likely to initiate international conflict than leaders without
binding term limits.
Hypothesis 1b takes diversionarymotives as given and superimposes binding terms into
the conflict calculus. The result is to produce a very straightforward hypothesis. How-
ever, the hypothesis does not specifically address motivation. By concentrating on the
source of domestic discontent thought to provoke diversionary behavior, we should be
better able to flesh out the implications term limitsmay ormay not have in diversionary
war settings. The remainder of this subsection delves into a specific domestic factor
known to affect diversionary incentives, namely, the state of the economy.
Theories of diversionary war pervade the field of conflict studies. And rarely has
so much sustained attention yielded such inconsistent results. Establishing a general
relationship between domestic affairs and international conflict, while straightfor-
ward in theory, has proved highly elusive (Levy 1989; Leeds and Davis 1997). Early
studies to hypothesize a link between regime type and diversionary behavior
provided inconclusive results (Zinnes and Wilkenfeld 1971). As a consequence,
scholars have tended to focus on the conditions under which diversionary conflicts
are more likely to occur. Gelpi (1997) finds evidence that diversionary initiation of
force is generally a pathology of democratic systems—one not shared by autocratic
regimes. Conversely, Miller (1999) finds that democracies are less likely to escalate
militarized disputes on account of diversionary impulses than are nondemocracies.
Work specifically examining the United States has proved both controversial and
difficult to replicate in large-N analyses. As noted, Hess and Orphanides (1995)
argue that incumbent US presidents have been more inclined to resort to force
abroad during times of economic recession. And Russett’s (1990b) efforts similarly
support the claim that US dispute involvement is negatively related to economic
activity. Ostrom and Job (1986) review biannual, post–WWII data for the United
States and find that the propensity to use major force is significantly related to an
‘‘economic misery’’ index. But many of these studies and their underlying empirics
have been heavily criticized. The conclusions and suppositions they employ have
elicited a host of efforts to replicate the findings by altering measures for key vari-
ables or repeating the analyses in different periods (e.g., James and Oneal 1991). The
results of such efforts have been mixed at best and the United States is likely to be
the exception rather than the norm, given its position of power.4
The relationship between conflict and economic activity continues to receive
attention from students of international politics. Conclusions, however, are again
inconsistent across studies.5 An early piece by Thompson (1982) finds no evidence
to support the hypothesis that business cycles are systematically related to war initia-
tion. Focusing his analysis on the United States, Fordham (1998) argues that high
unemployment is more likely to prompt a diversionary incentive from left-leaning
leaders, whereas right-leaning leaders favor diversionary action when facing higher
inflation. According to Fordham, Republicans and Democrats face differing costs
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associated with the use of macroeconomic policy to combat inflation and reduce
unemployment. More recently, Blomberg and Hess (2002) show that recessions
do cause a substantial increase in the likelihood of external conflicts, but only in the
presence of an internal conflict (e.g., ethnic conflict or genocide). Miller (1999)
finds that changes in economic growth rates are negatively related to the level
of force used in international militarized disputes, but the result is only significant
in less democratic states. Tir (2010) finds weak support for the hypothesis that poor
economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict
initiation. Oneal and Tir (2006) argue that economic conditions do impact the like-
lihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dis-
pute, but that the growth rates necessary to precipitate wars between democracies
are rare.
While the approaches and results vary, the catalog ofwork onwar and recessions has
established the basic premise that recessions and poor economic activity tend to gener-
ate positive expectations for diversionary war. However, arguments about the state of
the economyand theuseof force rely criticallyupon the assumption that a leader’s grasp
of power is acutely sensitive to economic factors. If we are to improve our understand-
ing of the relationship between economic conditions and the resort to force, we need to
better apprehend the degree towhich the preservation of office depends upon economic
conditions absent a dispute.Making precisely this point,Arena (2010) further notes that
if readily observable factors can help determine the relative importance of economic
conditions, then we can better isolate those cases where diversionary relationships are
most likely to obtain compared to when they are not.
Fortunately, term limits offer a unique opportunity to probe more carefully the
assumption that a leader’s fate is linked with the economy. The goal is to determine
when a leader’s likelihood of retaining office is more or less dependent on extant
economic influences. In a crude, yet effective fashion, term limits allow us to do this.
When term limits are binding, the degree to which a leader’s probability of maintain-
ing power depends on the economy is effectively zero. Conversely, when leaders are
not in final terms of office, their electoral fate will be tied to the economy to varying
degrees. Precisely howmuch, we are unable to say. But, when term limits are a bind-
ing constraint, a leader’s sensitivity to the state of the economy out of electoral con-
cern is diminished to the point of irrelevancy. And when term limits are not a factor,
the economy may be an influential issue in a leader’s election fate. This logic indi-
cates that leaders facing binding term limits should be immune from the diversionary
incentives typically precipitated by economic downturns.
Hypothesis 2: Immunity hypothesis–Leaders facing binding term limits will be no
more likely to initiate conflict during periods of economic recession than
during nonrecessionary periods.
Hypothesis 2 takes advantage of term limits as a binary proxy for a leader’s electoral
sensitivity to the economy. Evidence in support of this hypothesis would indicate
8 Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
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that diversionary motives are indeed conditioned on the need to win elections; the
absence of the latter should be associated with the disappearance of the former, even
in the face of a recession.
Testing the possibility that third parties anticipate the likely impact of term limits on
a leader’s behavior in crisis situations invites a similar line of reasoning. That expecta-
tions shouldplaya role in conflict is hardly controversial, but precisely how theymaydo
sowhen term limits are a relevant factor is not obvious.Fortunately,wemay takeadvan-
tage of the ‘‘political bias’’ argument outlined earlier, by interpreting it from the per-
spective of potential challengers. The prohibition of reelection altogether (on account
of term limits) affords a leader a certain freedom of response when challenged from
abroad—an increasedwar bias. Term-limited leaders face no domestic electoral conse-
quences from the potential high costs of warfare, which allows them to engage in
aggressive foreign policy if they deem it necessary. Taken to the extreme, latitude to
be reckless may be conducive for discouraging foreign provocations. In essence, the
inflection of the political bias argument underlyingHypothesis 1a suggests that a heigh-
tened war bias effectively deters third parties from challenging term-limited leaders.
Relatedly, scholarship examining the explicit connection between the timing of
leadership tenure and international crises has demonstrated that incumbents are
more likely to participate in conflicts early in their tenure rather than later
(Chiozza and Goemans 2003). Several studies argue that age and tenure are impor-
tant factors in foreign affairs and that political immaturity is a liability to be
exploited by targeting states. A leader’s experience in office tends to deter offen-
sive advances from third parties. Inexperience, on the other hand, produces the
opposite effect—it attracts foreign challenges. Gelpi and Grieco’s (2001) explana-
tion for the deterring effect of experience is that resisting challenges becomes less
costly the longer a leader has enjoyed the privileges of office. Focusing exclusively
on the US case, Potter (2007) similarly posits that inexperience has an important
explanatory role in the genesis of many American foreign policy crises. This is
because young and inexperienced leaders may possess relatively weak manage-
ment structures and administrations, thereby raising the likelihood of mishandling
crises. Potter demonstrates that the accrual of time in office significantly lowers
the chances that US presidents will be involved in militarized disputes and inter-
national crises. These expectations and results also accord with a formal model by
Wolford (2007), where challenging states share an incentive to target newly
elected leaders in order to gauge their resolve.
When tenure regulations permit more than a single term, leaders reaching last terms
will bemorepracticed in the field of foreignaffairs and likelypossess greater diplomatic
know-how than in prior terms. Taken together, the discussion on leader experience and
the inflected political bias hypothesis generate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: Experience hypothesis–Leaders facing binding term limits should
less likely be targeted in international crises than are leaders without binding term
limits.
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In spite of these arguments and expectations, other, albeit weaker, evidence suggests
the opposite conclusion. Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005) find that the like-
lihood that a state will be challenged increases with the age of that state’s leader.
This finding comports with work by Bak and Palmer (2010), which finds strong evi-
dence that older leaders are significantly more likely to be the targets of militarized
disputes.6 Bak and Palmer speculate this link might be due to varying levels of tes-
tosterone across leader ages. These findings alone represent somewhat of an empiri-
cal oddity, largely unsubstantiated by theoretical insight.
If the younger are typically more aggression prone, then potential challengers
may avoid targeting young leaders out of fear of escalation. While a leader’s age
is (trivially) increasing in the number of terms served, this age difference is not
large, and such a gap does not necessarily exist when comparing leaders between
countries or across time. Another possible explanation is that younger leaders and
those earlier in their tenures may be more sensitive to the costs of concessions. If
concessions to foreign challenges early in a leader’s tenure represent a greater
domestic political liability, then young leaders may be more likely to meet aggres-
sion with strong resistance earlier rather than later in their tenure. Anticipating
escalation, foreign regimes may be less willing to target leaders earlier in their
elected tenure. These explanations are in no way intended to be exhaustive. It is
sufficient to maintain that if third parties believe that term-limited leaders will
have fewer predictable incentives to respond aggressively to challenges from
abroad, then they will attempt to alter the status quo only once leaders in target
states have reached final terms. While these arguments are only weakly motivated
by existing theories, as a counterpoint to Hypothesis 3a, we offer the following
competing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Attraction hypothesis–Leaders facing binding term limits should
more likely be targeted in international crises than should leaders without bind-
ing term limits.
Permanent Referendum Theory
Work by Howell and Pevehouse (2005) notes that the subfield of American politics
has developed ample theories on interactions between the executive and legislative
branches. However, much of this work has ignored the international use of force as a
dependent variable. As Howell and Pevehouse point out, there has been little to no
cross-pollination between theories of executive and legislative interaction and the
use of force.
Drawing on literature from US politics, there is equally consistent logic and
evidence to suggest binding term limits ought not matter in world politics. Bruce
Russett observed that the impact of elections on US dispute participation greatly
decreased after 1930. He postulated that the advent of frequent polling and constant
media coverage has produced ‘‘something akin to a permanent referendum on
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elected officials,’’ (1990a p. 134) where elected officials must align their politics
with public opinion more or less throughout their entire tenure in office. Permanent
referendum theory suggests the impact of a term limit on a leader’s behavior will be
short-lived or nominal at best. Only the most parochial of elected officials will make
international policy decisions with blatant disregard for extant domestic considera-
tions. The scope of factors affecting executive decision making, including use of
force, extends well beyond one-shot elections.
The theoretical basis for this view comes directly from strands of research in Amer-
ican politics, which establishes that electorates are indeed retrospective (Fiorina 1978)
and that public support impacts a leader’s leeway of action (Neustadt 1960). This is
because leaders operating within the confines of strong legislative institutions ‘‘share
the public.’’ Popular prestige and public support are indeed precious forms of political
capital, to be expended strategically for the purpose of obtaining congressional
approval for various programmatic initiatives (Rivers and Rose 1985; Edwards 1990).
Investigations into referendum-voting models have explored the interactive
nature of executive and legislative power. Efforts here demonstrate a strong and per-
sistent link between the policies associated with the president’s administration and
the outcome of midterm congressional elections. Citizen evaluation of the perfor-
mance of the president is directly and positively related to the vote for candidates
in the incumbent president’s party (Tufte 1975; Marra and Ostrom 1989). Executive
policies during the first two years of an administration impact local elections. But
this relationship is not strictly a one-way affair.
Midterm elections are among a host of variables shown to impact presidential
actions. In fact, the constraints facing a president at any one time are more manifold
than a basic ‘‘election-on, election-off’’ archetype. Work by Rhode and Simon (1985)
suggests a leader’s ability and latitude for pursuing a political agenda is highly sensi-
tive to both popularity as well as partisan control of Congress; this is especially true
during times of economic hardship. The authors show that the five most salient factors
in explaining the use of presidential veto power are public approval, congressional seat
proportion, international conflict, midterm election year, and an economic–political
context interaction term, but not the presidential election year covariate. Where con-
gressional elections mattered, presidential ones did not.
The permanent referendum logic assumes all elections matter, more or less, not
merely those choosing heads of state. Furthermore, it is based on the assumption that
the broader electing public remains shared between heads of state and other elected
officials, each possessing varying degrees of redistributive capacity. Consequently, a
leader’s scope for action at any given time remains acutely sensitive to popular
sentiments among a shared public. These premises and alternative distinctions lead
to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Permanent referendum hypothesis– Leaders with binding term lim-
its will be no more or less likely to initiate international conflict than will lead-
ers without binding term limits.
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Empirical Analysis
To assess the role of term limits, we estimate the effect of the term limit variable on
leader behavior or behavior of opposing actors toward these leaders in the realm of
conflict. The universe of relevant cases for our investigation consists of all demo-
cratic regimes for which leaders potentially could face binding term limits.7 This
excludes democratic leaders in regimes that do not have any regulations on the num-
ber of terms a leader can stay in office. Any effects estimated for this universe of
cases only apply to leaders that operate within political institutions that feature term
limits. We cannot extrapolate our findings to the behavior of leaders in other democ-
racies, most often parliamentary regimes, without making strong assumptions about
the comparability of such regimes. Furthermore, we base our analysis on a nonran-
dom sample of cases, which always raises the possibility of selection effects. How-
ever, our data cover a large part of the available universe of cases, and we have no
reason to believe that sample selection was driven by factors affecting term limits or
conflict initiation. A second and more important concern is the absence of random
assignment of binding term limits. Our data (detailed in the following) record for
each country-year whether a leader faces a binding term limit, that is, cannot run for
reelection. According to this setup, binding term limit assignment does not follow a
simple exogenous random process, but is rather determined by various observable
and unobservable factors. While we cannot completely rule out that the presence
of binding term limits is determined by unobserved factors that also drive the initia-
tion of conflict, we do control for a number of important observable covariates and
explore various strategies to account for dependence between observations.
Data Structure and Sources
Our data on term limits in democracies build upon that used in previous research on
fiscal policy and term limits (Nogare and Ricciuti 2011). The term-limit variable is
coded as 1 if in a given country-year the chief executive faces a binding term limit
preventing him or her from running for reelection and as 0 otherwise. This informa-
tion is largely based on the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
Nogare and Ricciuti go to great lengths to double-check mistakes in the original data
and attempt a correct coding for the period 1977–2000. Nonetheless, we identified
several cases for which the data set lists existing term limits (often for the president),
while the actual chief executive can stand for reelection several times (often the
prime minister). We excluded all cases for which the term limits only apply to cer-
emonial heads of state and heads of state with very limited powers. We also
reviewed each country-year in the data set for accuracy via a process of fact
checking and recoded various country-years. Additionally, we expanded the data set
to include countries with binding term limits in Asia and Africa. Our data cover
forty-eight democracies from 1976 to 2000.8 In all empirical estimations, we only
use observations from that time period with a Polity2 score larger than five. As a
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robustness check, we also distinguish between permanent or ‘‘strong’’ term limits,
those ruling out reelection after a fixed number of terms, and ‘‘weak’’ term limits
that only prohibit consecutive terms.9
The specific unit of observation for our analysis of term limits and conflict will be
the directed country-dyad-year. Increasingly, researchers have used directed dyads
as the standard data structure for evaluating the strategic interaction of leaders in the
international sphere. Directed dyads consist of country-year pairs that record the
dyad characteristics of the sender and receiver, as well as dyad specific
characteristics.
Two other papers have started to investigate the link between term limits and
international crises. Haynes (2012) analyzes the effect of term limits on the credibil-
ity of threats within international disputes. He shows that term limits make
presidents less effective in crisis bargaining, but have no discernible effect on crisis
outcomes. A related working paper by Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2010)
engages the role of term limits for democratic peace. It argues that democratic lead-
ers facing term limits should be as likely as nondemocratic leaders to be involved in
interstate conflict. The authors use data on dyadic conflicts from 1816 to 2001, cov-
ering 177 countries. Their analysis relies on a nondirected dyadic structure, discard-
ing information on sender and receiver. Their term-limit variable records whether
any of the countries in a purely democratic dyad are term limit constrained. They
find the presence of a binding term limit in a democratic dyad negates the demo-
cratic peace effect. Both sets of findings suggest promise for our investigation, but
since their research focus is somewhat different, we believe for our hypotheses an
alternative approach is preferable. We focus on the emergence of conflict, not on
bargaining within conflict episodes, and analyze the processes of initiation and being
targeted separately. Relying on a directed dyad design (and considering information
on dyad members) is especially important for understanding the interaction between
recessions and term limits.
Since the use of directed dyads often leads to very large data sets, applied
researchers often focus on reduced samples that restrict attention to ‘‘politically
relevant’’ dyads, as defined by major power status and contiguity. We follow this
approach and furthermore only consider directed dyads from 1976 to 2000, the time
frame for which information on term limits is available. Since we are not interested
in evaluating broader theories of conflict, but rather only care about the effect of
term limits on leader behavior, we additionally restrict our attention to dyads for
which the initiator (or target) is a state with constitutionally proscribed term limits.
This automatically excludes dyads between autocracies, semidemocracies, and full
democracies without term limits from the sample. The goal is to create a sample in
which the units with binding term limits are very similar on all other dimensions to
the control units. Excluding nondemocracies and democracies without term limits as
senders or receivers helps to increase comparability.
The statistical literature on international war has established that several variables
significantly help explain the onset of conflict (e.g., O’Neal and Russett 1999;
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Bennett and Stam 2004). We include a set of standard controls. Specifically, in all
models we include the Polity2 scores to measure the level of democracy, the relative
military capabilities of sender versus receiver to identify dyads with military
imbalances, major power status, and the physical distance between dyad members.
Information on these covariates comes from the militarized interstate dispute
(MIDS) data set (Ghosn et al. 2003).
To test the interaction between term limits and diversionary behavior during eco-
nomic downturns, we also need additional information on the state of the economy.
As discussed, one of the seminal contributions to the analysis of recessions and con-
flict is the Hess and Orphanides (1995) work on US conflict initiation. In their
article, Hess and Orphanides use data on real output, industrial production, unem-
ployment, and the Gallup Poll survey to date recessions for the United States. Unfor-
tunately, data on variables other than output do not exist or are prohibitively difficult
to obtain for the forty-eight countries we have identified, given the period we ana-
lyze. However, we are able to obtain real gross domestic product (GDP) data for
these countries for the years 1976 to 2000. The Economic Research Service (of the
USDA) publishes the ‘‘International Macroeconomics Dataset,’’ which includes
annual real GDP data, reported in billions of dollars at 2005 prices.
Hess and Orphanides (1995) compute the change in output, DQ, for each year of
their data set, where Q is real GDP. They then compare DQ in each year to the sam-
ple mean of the very same variable for the time period chosen. Thereafter, they cre-
ate a recession dummy variable which is equal to 1 in each year that DQ was below
average in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Importantly, because the Hess and
Orphanides approach merely reflects years of below average economic performance,
it does not conform well to typical definitions of recessions. An additional problem
with the Hess and Orphanides approach for capturing recessions is its high sensitiv-
ity toward bias. The comparison of DQ in each year to the sample mean over the
whole sample period implies that just one unusually large value of DQ may bias the
results, since a large value will raise the sample mean and increase the likelihood
that any given year is counted as a recessionary observation. For these reasons,
we employ alternative approaches to capture and reflect recessions, using data that
are easily available.
The main method we use to date recessions follows an ‘‘output gap’’ approach.
This idea is based on the notion that countries have some level of ‘‘potential’’ output
that their factors of production are capable of producing at any given moment. One
conventional way to compute potential GDP is using the Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) filter on actual data for real GDP (e.g., see Gali and Gertler 1999). In essence,
the HP filter is a mathematical tool that separates the cyclical component of a time
series from its raw data, which effectively removes short-term fluctuations that are
associated with the business cycle, thereby revealing long-term trends. Thus, we
estimate the output gap by computing the HP detrended log of real GDP for the
countries in the sample. Finally, we set our recession dummy variable equal to 1 for
observations where actual output is below potential output (i.e., a negative output
14 Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
gap), and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we also consider another popular way of
classifying recessions. Shiskin (1974) suggested that a good rule-of-thumb indicator
of recessions is two quarters of successive negative real economic growth. Given our
real GDP data, our second recession dummy variable is equal to 1 if there is negative
real economic growth in a particular year, and 0 otherwise.
Results
Turning to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we analyze the effect of a binding term limit on
the probability of initiating conflict in a dyadic setting. To test this specific premise,
we create a sample of dyads in which the initiator belongs to our sample of democ-
racies with potentially binding term limits and the receiver is of any regime type.
Our dependent variable is the initiation of a militarized dispute.10
We first present results for a standard logit model with robust standard errors
clustered on the dyad and a relogit model to correct for rare-events bias (King and
Zeng 2001). We also consider an alternative term-limit dummy variable that
includes only incidents of strong term limits and omits those cases in which political
leaders can rerun for office after a specified waiting time (weak term limits). Finally,
Table 1. Conflict Initiation and Term Limits.
(1) Logit,
clustered SE
(2) Relogit,
clustered SE
(3) Logit,
clustered SE
(4) Logit,
clustered SE
Distance 0.000278**
(0.000106)
0.000278**
(0.000106)
0.000273**
(0.000105)
0.000277**
(0.000105)
Democracy receiver 0.0589***
(0.0156)
0.0591***
(0.0156)
0.0586***
(0.0155)
0.0589***
(0.0155)
Relative capabilities 0.00178
(0.00119)
0.00142
(0.00119)
0.00180
(0.00121)
0.00182
(0.00121)
Major power sender 0.625 (0.667) 0.607 (0.666) 0.447 (0.611) 0.565 (0.626)
Major power
receiver
0.333 (0.950) 0.251 (0.949) 0.400 (0.931) 0.362 (0.936)
Term limit sender 0.738þ (0.416) 0.742þ (0.415)
‘‘Strong’’ term limit
sender
0.700þ (0.416)
Term limit
(ordered) sender
0.390þ (0.205)
Constant 4.155***
(0.540)
4.126***
(0.540)
3.981***
(0.495)
4.099***
(0.503)
Observations 7381 7381 7381 7381
AIC 795.3 . 795.1 794.7
BIC 843.6 . 843.4 843.1
Note. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion; BIC ¼ Bayesian information criterion; SE ¼ Standard errors
are given in parentheses.
þp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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we also construct an ordinal variable that takes the value 0 for leaders able to run for
office in the next term, 1 for leaders that cannot run for office the immediate next
term, but potentially at future dates (the previously excluded ‘‘weak’’ cases) and 2
for leaders facing a permanent term limit.11 This Term Limit ordered variable pro-
vides the opportunity to assess the logic of term limits at differing levels of intensity.
As noted, we employ the usual covariates from the conflict literature mentioned
earlier as controls. Table 1 shows the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and p-
values for the logit and relogit models.
The results suggest that the distinction between term limited and reelection-
seeking leaders has a statistically significant impact on the decision-making cal-
culus of conflict initiation. The coefficient for the term-limit dummy has a pos-
itive sign and is significant below the 10 percent level for both the standard logit
and the relogit model. Additionally, several control variables affect incidence of
militarized disputes. Physical distance reduces the likelihood of conflict initia-
tion, while interacting with a democratic country also reduces the chances of
a militarized dispute. Notwithstanding the substantial effects of distance and
democracy, the term limit impact is not only statistically significant but also
substantive importance. Democratic leaders facing a binding term limit are on
average 0.6 percentage points more likely to initiate conflict, compared to their
reelection facing counterparts. Given the low unconditional baseline probability
for conflict of 1 percent in the sample, the institutional constraint of term limits
increases the likelihood of conflict by more than 50 percent. Similarly, the
results are robust to using the alternative term-limit measures. When we reclas-
sify cases in which leaders can rerun for office at later dates, we still obtain
nearly identical estimates for the term limit effect. Our ordinal measure of term
limits is equally positive and statistically significant below the 10 percent level.
These results clearly provide support for Hypothesis 1a over 1b. Leaders reach-
ing final terms appear to have a higher bias for conflict initiation.
A typical problem in the analysis of dyadic data is the dependence of observa-
tions. One sensible approach to deal with the dependence structure is the use of
Table 2. Conflict Initiation, Bayesian RE.
Posterior mode Lower 95 percent HPD Upper 95 percent HPD
(Intercept) 3.735 4.430 3.540
Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Democracy receiver 0.051 0.055 0.019
Relative capabilities 0.000 0.001 0.000
Major power sender 0.033 0.571 0.388
Major power receiver 0.141 0.907 0.114
Term limit sender 0.476 0.194 0.761
N 7,381
Note. HPD ¼ highest posterior density.
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Bayesian hierarchical models. In particular, we use a limited dependent variable
setup in which each dyad will have its own random intercept, drawn from a normal
distribution. More specifically, the indicator variable yijt takes the value 1 if country i
initiated an MID with country j in year t, and zero otherwise. The linear predictor
Zijt, which is linked to the probability of an MID via a canonical link function
g(), is a function of covariates in the following form:
Zijt ¼ aij þ X 0bþ Ti þ eijt;
whereX 0b are dyad-specific covariates and Ti is the term limit dummy. The random
dyad effects aij are drawn from a normal distribution, as are the observation specific
Table 3. Conflict Initiation and Term Limits.
(1) Logit,
clustered SE
(2) Relogit,
clustered SE
(3) Logit,
clustered SE
(4) Logit,
clustered SE
Distance 0.000281**
(0.000106)
0.000281**
(0.000105)
0.000277**
(0.000104)
0.000280**
(0.000105)
Democracy receiver 0.0613***
(0.0159)
0.0615***
(0.0159)
0.0608***
(0.0158)
0.0612***
(0.0158)
Relative capabilities 0.00180
(0.00120)
0.00145
(0.00120)
0.00183
(0.00122)
0.00185
(0.00122)
Major power sender 0.614
(0.635)
0.582
(0.634)
0.424
(0.587)
0.533
(0.599)
Major power receiver 0.328
(0.941)
0.247
(0.940)
0.397
(0.924)
0.361
(0.927)
Term limit sender 1.216**
(0.386)
1.208**
(0.385)
Recession 0.721*
(0.301)
0.703*
(0.301)
0.659*
(0.283)
0.707*
(0.296)
Term Limit  Recession 0.868*
(0.413)
0.850*
(0.413)
‘‘Strong’’ Term
Limit Sender
1.164**
(0.388)
‘‘Strong’’ Term
Limit  Recession
0.897*
(0.426)
Term Limit (ordered)
Sender
0.631***
(0.191)
Term Limit
(ordered)  Recession
0.462*
(0.218)
Constant 4.564***
(0.507)
4.498***
(0.507)
4.338***
(0.493)
4.477***
(0.479)
Observations 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
AIC 793.1 . 793.3 792.6
BIC 855.2 . 855.5 854.8
Note. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion; BIC ¼ Bayesian information criterion. Standard errors are
given in parentheses.
þp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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error terms eijt. The inclusion of dyad-random effects allows for partial pooling and can
easily be integrated in a Bayesian context (Gelman and Hill 2007). Table 2 reports pos-
teriormodes and 95percent highest posterior density (HPD) intervals for all variables.12
TheBayesian hierarchicalmodel confirms the results from the standard logit approach.
The posterior 95 percent HPD interval for the term-limit variable is clearly bound away
from zero and positive. Accounting for random dyad effects, our confidence in the
term-limit effect is even higher than in the classicalmodels—with a larger than 95 percent
posterior probability, term limits increase the likelihood of conflict initiation.
Overall, these findings suggest leaders are more likely to initiate conflict during
final terms in office, once elections/reelections are safely behind them. The logit, relo-
git, and Bayesian hierarchical models all indicate that arriving in final and binding
terms strongly increases the probability of conflict initiation. Our analysis of these
cases dismisses any notion that the requirement of public approval alone should pre-
cipitate militarized involvements. On the contrary, we find that casting off the impera-
tive of seeking public mandate affords leaders a free hand to pursue conflict initiatives.
Or, as has been suggested, it may also render them less politically vulnerable to audi-
ence costs associated with bad outcomes or the failure to deliver good ones. Thus,
leaders are more disposed to hazard war when the risk of losing office is no longer
an issue. The consequence is that elections are indeed a restraint to bellicosity.
Hypothesis 2 states diversionary conflict may be precipitated by economic down-
turns. Therefore, leaders are more likely to initiate diversionary conflict during eco-
nomic hardship, but only when reelection is a concern. If term limits have an effect
on the decision making of leaders, we expect the role of recessions to change, con-
ditional on the presence of a binding term limit. To assess this possibility, we include
a dummy variable for the presence of a recession and an interaction term between a
binding term limit and our recession dummy.13 Table 3 shows the results for the logit
and relogit estimation including these two additional predictors.
In line with diversionary expectations, the constituent coefficient for economic
downturns has a positive effect on conflict initiation, when there are no binding term
limits, that is, the term limit variable and interaction are both zero.14 This effect is
statistically significant below the 5 percent level across all models. Furthermore, the
finding is robust to alternative measures of recession. (The Supplementary Online
Table 4. Conditional First Difference Effects.
Main variable
Conditioning
variable Estimate
Lower 95
percent CI
Upper 95
percent CI
Term limit effect Recession ¼ 0 0.0103 0.0028 0.0215
Term limit effect Recession ¼ 1 0.004 0.006 0.020
Recession effect Term Limit ¼ 0 0.004 0.0007 0.009
Recession effect Term Limit ¼ 1 0.001 0.008 0.008
Note. CI ¼ confidence interval.
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Appendix reports results using the Shiskin measure). Importantly, the term-limit
variable indicates a statistically significant and substantively meaningful effect
during times of no recession, which is now even more statistically significant than
in the preceding model. This confirms the results of the prior analysis; that is,
electoral constraints reduce belligerence. The interaction term between term limits
and the recession dummy is estimated to be negative and statistically significant
at the 5 percent level, evidence of a meaningful interaction. (Similar results are
obtained for the other term limit and recession measures.)
To correctly assess the substantive conditional effect of term limits, we simulate
predicted probability differences in the two scenarios. Table 4 reports the mean
effect of term limits and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals with and
without a concurrent recession. Because an interaction term always implies a condi-
tional effect for the conditioning variable, it is important to also assess the symmetric
effect on the conditioning variable (Berry et al. 2003). Hence, the table also shows
the effect of recessions with and without a binding term limit on conflict initiation.
As is evident from the first row, in the absence of a recession, term limits
increase the probability of conflict initiation by approximately 1 percentage point;
that is, leaders who are unconstrained by concerns of the electorate are more likely
to explore and pursue confrontational policies in the international sphere. Note that
this effect is nearly twice as large compared to our estimation in Table 1. Condi-
tioning on the presence of recessions sharpens our findings with regard to term
limits. By contrast, leaders facing reelection are appreciatively more pacific absent
a recession. During a recession, however, (second row) the joint impact is much
more muted and is not statistically significant. Similarly, a recession increases the
probability of conflict by about 0.4 percentage points for leaders that may seek
reelection (third row). When the length of a leader’s tenure is still at the discretion
of voters, recessions induce diversionary behavior. However, once the necessity of
reelection is removed (fourth row), the effect turns negative on average, and again
loses statistical significance.
These conditional effects tease out the role of electoral motives and economic
downturns and imply important differences, depending on the leader’s constraints.
Recessions only increase bellicosity if leaders face future elections. Without the link
between the electorate’s preferences and the leader’s hold on office, economic down-
turns do not necessarily induce conflictual behavior, showing that the causal channel
of recessions on conflict operates through an electoral link. Similarly, the vote-
winning requirement reduces the probability of conflict initiation, but only when the
economy is doing well. In times of recession, non-term-limited leaders are pushed to
pursue more conflictual policies. These findings are highly consistent with existing
theoretical models that anticipate a clear pacifying or restraining effect of elections.
To further probe the robustness of these results, we again implement a Bayesian
hierarchical model with dyad random effects. Again, we find recessions have a
clear positive effect on conflict initiation, while the constituent term limit effect is
also positive. The interaction term is estimated to be negative. For each term, the
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95 percent HPD interval does not include zero. Simulations based on this model for
the conditional effects confirm the results of the classical estimation. (Detailed
results can be found in the Supplementary Online Appendix.) These findings provide
clear evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2, a qualified interpretation of the classical
diversionary war argument. Importantly, the qualification is grounded purely in
election motives. We are able to accept the premise that recessions during
election-seeking cycles promote more conflicts. However, the interaction between
binding terms and economic downturns shows that term limits can negate the diver-
sionary effect of recessions. Conversely, the pacifying effects of electoral accountabil-
ity only apply in nonrecessionary times. Our results indicate a rich contextual effect of
institutional constraints, given the wider political and economic environment, and pro-
vide important points of connection between disparate strands of the literature.
Hypothesis 3a and 3b address the possibility that external actors anticipate a dis-
tinction between the behavior of leaders in final terms from those who are not. If this
is indeed the case, then we should observe an effect of binding term limits on the
probability of being targeted in an international conflict. To test this expectation,
we analyze the effect of term limit variables on the probability of being targeted
Table 5. Conflict Target and Term Limits.
(1) Logit,
clustered SE
(2) Relogit,
clustered SE
(3) Logit,
clustered SE
(4) Logit,
clustered SE
Distance 0.000377***
(0.0000904)
0.000374***
(0.0000904)
0.000372***
(0.0000906)
0.000375***
(0.0000901)
Democracy Sender 0.671**
(0.248)
0.663**
(0.248)
0.676**
(0.258)
0.672**
(0.253)
Relative Capabilities 0.0168
(0.0163)
0.0141
(0.0163)
0.0172
(0.0170)
0.0169
(0.0166)
Major Power Sender 0.855
(0.885)
0.865
(0.884)
0.814
(0.893)
0.831
(0.887)
Major Power Receiver 0.468
(0.587)
0.458
(0.586)
0.583
(0.565)
0.519
(0.566)
Term Limit Receiver 0.277
(0.435)
0.281
(0.435)
‘‘Strong’’ Term Limit
Receiver
0.168
(0.471)
Term Limit
(ordered) Receiver
0.121
(0.227)
Constant 9.580***
(2.325)
9.478***
(2.322)
9.503***
(2.332)
9.535***
(2.321)
Observations 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
AIC 653.1 . 653.5 653.3
BIC 701.4 . 701.8 701.6
Note. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion; BIC ¼ Bayesian information criterion; Standard errors are
given in parentheses.
þp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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in dyadic conflicts using a similar approach as above. We create a sample in which
the target in the directed dyad belongs to our group of countries with potentially
binding term limits, while the sender can be of any regime type. In this case, being
the target of an MID is the dependent variable. We include the same control vari-
ables as in the previous models. Table 5 shows the results for the logit and relogit
models with robust standard errors clustered at the dyad level.
In contrast to the initiation case, term limits have no discernible, independent effect
on the probability of being the target of an MID. The estimated coefficient is positive,
that is, suggests that term limited leaders are more likely to be targeted, opposite to the-
oretical expectations based on Hypothesis 3a. Once we repeat the analysis using the
Bayesian hierarchical model with dyad random effects, we find term limits have a clear
positive effect on a leader’s probability of being targeted (results available in the Sup-
plementary Online Appendix). With more than 95 percent posterior probability, the
parameterofour term limit dummy lies in the interval [0.338, 1.219].Overall, the results
indicate somemixed support for Hypothesis 3b, but given the theoretical and empirical
ambiguities, future research will have to decipher this particular puzzle in more detail.
Taken together, our findings in support of Hypotheses 1a and 2 directly contradict
the permanent referendum argument (Hypothesis 4). Despite the widespread notion
of constant presidential attention to domestic public opinion polls, in the interna-
tional setting we find that institutional constraints play a powerful role in shaping
the behavior of leaders.
Discussion
Although the assumption that leaders behave so as to stay in power does not easily
lend itself to direct verification, we have attempted to gain leverage on this premise
by deriving falsifiable implications from it. The basic question directing this inquiry
is whether a change in the election-seeking status of a leader impacts the initiation of
international conflict as well as the likelihood of being a target of such conflict. Or
simply put, do term limits matter in international relations? Cost- and benefit-based
political bias rationales for conflict as well as diversionary theories of war suggest
that term limits should matter—albeit for different reasons. However, the permanent
referendum hypothesis casts doubt on such reasoning, positing that term limits alone
should have only a nominal effect on conflict calculus, if any.
The short answer to the question above is that term limits do matter. Altering
election constraints affects conflict in ways that make it difficult to sustain a perma-
nent referendum theory. Term limits are a domestic political institution with the
capacity to impact the realm of foreign affairs. The evidence comports with theories
of office-seeking behavior, broadly speaking. When term limits interrupt or other-
wise obviate the dictates of political survival, leader behavior alters in meaningful
ways.15 We document a clear positive effect of binding term limits on the probability
of conflict initiation. The effect is furthermore substantively meaningful. Term lim-
ited leaders are, on average, more than half a percentage point more likely to initiate
Zeigler et al. 21
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
conflict, which constitutes an increase of more than 50 percent relative to the
baseline probability. Legacy issues and party loyalty may alter this result, and future
work should seek to incorporate these impacts. While a change in term-limit status
alters strongly the likelihood a leader will initiate conflict, there is less robust evi-
dence suggesting it also makes him or her more likely to be a target of conflicts. Both
the logit and relogit models reject Hypothesis 3b, which expects an increase in chal-
lenges to term-limited leaders. But the Bayesian hierarchical model offers support
for this premise. If anything, these mixed results provide motivation for future
research to investigate this matter in more detail.
Most importantly, a binding term limit interacts with and dampens the diversion-
ary impact of recessions. Across all our models and several robustness checks, we
consistently find a meaningful interaction between term limits and economic down-
turns. There are two observationally equivalent interpretations of these results. The
immunity hypothesis suggests that not having to seek reelection mitigates the need
for diversionary war during times of recession. Certainly, recessions do not favor
incumbents during times of election. But in the absence of election motives, heads
of state may dispense with diversionary endeavors. Alternatively, recessions may
pose an obstacle to conducting wars engendered via higher ‘‘political bias’’ during
final terms. This logic suggests that leaders with binding term limits find it harder to
take their nations to war during times of economic hardship, an impediment they do
not face during nonrecessionary periods. For instance, leaders may find it increas-
ingly difficult to finance military conflict during times of economic downturn.
Nonetheless, our findings indicate that the relationship between negative economic
factors and decisions to entertain international crises is subtler than originally
thought and is a puzzle that certainly merits more attention in the literature.
And finally, an implication of this study is that wars attributed to diversionary
motives are quite distinct from those initiated from positions of political security.
Although both are generally wars of choice, they each deserve independent scrutiny.
First, unpacking diversionary war is a complicated process. Certainly, democratic
leaders have a menu of options for responding to and diverting attention from reces-
sions, beyond starting international crises. Moreover, economic downturns are not
the only variable shown to produce diversionary incentives for international crises.
Future work should aim at incorporating some of these considerations. Second, wars
and disputes attributed to ‘‘political bias’’ mechanisms also warrant more investiga-
tion, including determining what types of conflicts (e.g. territorial) are more suscep-
tible to this form crisis posturing, and if these conflicts are initiated out of a
motivation to subvert domestic constraints such as term limits. Just as not all democ-
racies are the same, neither are the wars they choose to conduct.
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Notes
1. While social scientists have conducted similarly motivated investigations at the domestic
and state level for US politics (Besley and Case 1995, 2003) as well as for economic fiscal
behavior across countries (Nogare and Ricciuti 2011), the effects of term limits in the
subfield of international relations is both understudied and undertheorized. However, a
recent exception is Haynes (2012), who investigates the credibility of democratic threats
by ‘‘lame duck’’ presidents within conflict episodes.
2. We employ the terms final term and binding term limit interchangeably.
3. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the relevance of this theory.
4. See Oneal and Tir (2006) for a good review of the problems associated with some of these
works.
5. Tir (2010) offers a good summary of the findings from prior literature on the relationship
between economic conditions and conflict in a diversionary setting. Studies mentioned
here are not included in Tir.
6. We should also point out that the Bak and Palmer (2010) result deserves some qualifica-
tion, since the targeting effect on older leaders is stronger earlier in their term.
7. A leader in this context is a ‘‘political chief executive’’; that is, we only care about
political leaders that have far-reaching executive power.
8. For a complete list, please consult the Supplementary Online Appendix.
9. Weborrow the terminology for this distinction fromConconi, Sahuguet, andZanardi (2010).
10. In theory, we could disaggregate the MID measure according to the type of action, but we
believe for nearly all types of MID actions, the importance of leader decision making is
crucial and the measure should be as inclusive as possible.
11. We also implemented models in which we treated each of the three levels as categories,
with the same results.
12. The Bayesian hierarchical model with dyad random effects was implemented using the
MCMCglmm package in R. We rely on noninformative default priors, 20,000 draws from
the posterior, a burn-in of 2,000, and a thinning interval of 10. Standard tests of noncon-
vergence indicate no serious problems.
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13. We use two different indicators for recessions, relying on the output gap and the Shiskin
definitions of a recession.
14. See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) for the correct interpretation of interaction
effects.
15. We would not go so far as to claim that leaders reaching final terms behave like author-
itarian rulers, resemblances notwithstanding. Moreover, we do not compare rates of
conflict initiation between term-limited leaders and authoritarian heads of state.
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